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The subject of measuring the performance of registries has been a topic of policy 
discussions in recent years on the regional level due to the recast of the European 
Union (EU) port state control (PSC) directive which introduces incentives for flags 
which perform better. Since the current method used in the EU region entails some 
shortcomings, it has therefore been the subject of substantial scrutiny. Furthermore, 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed a set of performance 
indicators which however lacks the ability to measure compliance as set out in one of 
its strategic directions towards fostering global compliance. In this article, we develop 
and test a methodology to measure flag state performance which can be applied to the 
regional or global level and to other areas of legislative interest (e.g. recognized 
organizations, Document of Compliance Companies). Our proposed methodology 
overcomes some of the shortcomings of the present method and presents a more 
refined, less biased approach of measuring performance. To demonstrate its 
usefulness, we apply it to a sample of 207,821 observations for a 3 year time frame 
and compare it to the best know current method in the industry. 
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Following a series of major oil tanker accidents in the 1970s, the concept of port state 
control (PSC) evolved to allow port states to conduct safety inspections on foreign 
flagged vessels entering its ports. The countries grouped themselves into PSC regimes 
based on Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and today, ten PSC regimes exist, 
covering most port states. These regional MoU’s enforce international legislation and 
act as a second line of defense against substandard shipping where the first line of 
defense is the flag state itself. 
 
The topic of measuring flag state performance was first introduced by the oldest PSC 
regime, the Paris MoU5 and was later adopted by the Tokyo MoU6. Each year, the 
“Black/Grey/White List (BGW-list) is published which is compiled using a specific 
method to classify registries into three groups – black, grey and white – where black 
listed flags perform worse than average and white listed flags perform better. In order 
to classify for any preferred treatment under the new recast EU directive, a registry 
needs to be on the white list. Given this new incentive, the current method of 
calculation has come under scrutiny recently because of its perceived inaccuracy in 
correctly determining each registry’s classification and, consequently, a debate has 
started with the aim of developing a more accurate method. Since its introduction, the 
list however has become the industry benchmarking standard for flag performance 
although it is only applied at the regional level. 
 
Despite the development of a complex legislative framework in the shipping industry, 
enforcement can be weak due to its international nature and can vary greatly on the 
flag state level. The legislative framework of about 50 conventions is developed by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) which is the regulator of the shipping 
industry but which lacks enforcement powers and does not monitor performance of its 
member states directly.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of enforcement, the IMO, through its technical cooperation 
committee (TCC), provides training and support to member states of developing 
countries and promotes harmonized enforcement of the legislative framework. In this 
respect, the IMO developed the Voluntary Member States Audit Scheme (VMSAS) 
which, at this stage, is voluntary but provides a mechanism to foster compliance. 
 
Furthermore, one of the IMO’s latest developments at council level encompasses the 
Strategic Plan for the Organization, of which the latest for the period 2008-2013 is 
based on Assembly Resolution A.989(25) [1] and sets out 13 broad strategic 
directions. Resolution A.990(25) [2] provides the corresponding High Level Action 
Plan (HLAP) for the 2008-2009 biennium. The IMO also developed a set of 42 
performance indicators (PI) to measure progress made towards the 13 strategic 
directions. Strategic direction 2 deals with fostering global compliance but the level of 
compliance is only measured as a global average and not on an individual member 
state level. The current PIs further only measure the willingness of countries to 
undergo a voluntary audit or present aggregated non-compliance rates. No individual 
measurement of flag states or countries is made which limits the IMO’s ability to 
identify weaknesses in the system. 
                                                 
5 The Paris MoU covers the EU, parts of Canada and the Russian Federation 
6 The Tokyo MoU covers Asia, Australia, Chile and parts of the Russian Federation 
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Given this situation, this article analyzes the current method for compiling the BGW-
list in section 2 and presents its major shortcomings. Section 3 develops a new method 
and applies it to a unique dataset of combined PSC inspection results and incident 
data. Section 4 summarizes the advantages of the method and provides a set of 
recommendations to the regulators on the regional level (e.g. PSC regimes) and the 
global level (IMO). The article ends with identifying other areas of application such 
as improved targeting for inspections and the measurement of performance of 
recognized organizations (RO) or Document of Compliance companies (DoC) on the 
regional or global level. 
 
 
2. The current method for measuring flag state performance (BGW-list) 
 
2.1. General concept of the current method 
 
The current method in force is presented in Equation 1(a),(b) [3] and is used to 
construct a confidence interval (the grey area) for the allowable number of detentions, 
centered by the allowable number of detentions (the yardstick) with a range on the left 
hand side from the lower limit to the yardstick (black to grey) and a range on the right 
hand side from the yardstick to the upper limit (grey to white). The underlying 
assumption to the formula is that the number of detentions follows a binomial 
distribution as detentions are counted in discrete numbers. The formula itself is 
derived from approximating this discrete binomial distribution by the continuous 
normal distribution. The reason for this approximation is simply because it simplifies 
the calculation of the limits. For calculating the discrete lower and upper limit a 
correction factor for continuity is added to each side (either +0.5 or -0.5). The lower 
and upper limits are calculated as 
 
)1.(.(5.0. ppNzpNu yblacktogre −++=              (1a) 
)1.(.(5.0. ppNzpNu egreytowhit −−−=              (1b) 
 
where 
ublacktogrey= lower (left)  limit of detentions for the grey area 
ugreytowhite= upper (right)  limit of detentions for the grey area 
N = number of inspections 
p = 0.07 (the set yardstick probably of a detention) 
z = 1.645 critical value of the normal distribution at confidence level of 95% 
 
The formula is applied each year to inspection data of the most recent 3 year period 
and with a minimum sample size of 30 or more inspections. Data from several PSC 
regimes are not combined and the lists are generated separately for the two regimes 
that currently use it (the Paris MoU and the Tokyo MoU). In order to make flags 
comparable, the concept of the excess factor (EF) is introduced with incremental steps 
of 0.03 for each EF - point. A flag with EF = 0 and below is placed on the white list 
while EF=1 and higher is used for the black list. Grey listed flags are between 0 and 1. 




2.2. Critique 1: Inability to handle small sample sizes and inaccurate approximation 
 
The use of the normal distribution to approximate the binomial distribution is based 
on the central limit theorem7 and is therefore only accurate if N (the number of 
inspections) is sufficiently large. Consequently, for relatively small N the situation can 
occur that the medium to high limit for inspections is negative which is problematic 
since the number of inspections cannot be negative. Furthermore, the accuracy of 
approximation can be very low.  
 
Figure 1 visualizes the concept of negative values for detentions for two yardsticks 
(p=0.07 and 0.05). One can see that the limit becomes positive at approx. 50 and 70 
inspections respectively. These cut off points, however, do not represent the minimum 
amount of observations one should use for a relative accurate approximation of the 
binomial distribution by the normal distribution which is the underlying concept of 
the formula on hand.  
 
Several rules of thumbs can be used to test the accuracy of the approximation and 
three of these are presented in Equation 2a-c (Schader and Schmid [4], Wackerly et al 
[5]) and were applied for p=0.07. A conservative approach was used and the results 
are presented in Table 1 for various sample sizes. One can easily see that sample sizes 
50 and 70 are too small while sample sizes 90 and 100 are on the limit. 
 
Figure 1: Cut off points at various yard sticks 





















yardstick G_W 0.07 yardstick G_W 0.05
 
 
rule of thumb 1: N*P*(1-p) should be >= 9(10)             (2a) 
rule of thumb 2: N*p or N(1-p) >58               (2b) 
rule of thumb 3: p+-2*Sqrt(p*(1-p)/N) should be between 0 and 1     (2c) 
 
                                                 
7 The central limit theorem states that the larger the sample size, the more closely the sampling distribution will 
resemble the normal distribution. 
8 N*p is used for 0 <=p<=0.5 which is applicable here in this case while N(1-p) is used for 0.5<p<1. 
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Table 1: Rule of Thumb (RoT) values for approximating the binomial distribution with 
the normal distribution (with p=0.07) 
  RoT 1 RoT 2 RoT 3 
N results N*p N*p*(1-p) p+-2*Sqrt(p*(1-p)/N 
Rule of Thumb > 5 (10) > 9 (10) Between 0 and 1 
50 too small 3.50 3.26 0.142 -0.002
70 too small 4.90 4.56 0.131 0.009
90 On limit 6.30 5.86 0.124 0.016
100 On limit 7.00 6.51 0.121 0.019
150 Ok 10.50 9.77 0.112 0.028
170 Ok 11.90 11.07 0.109 0.031
200 Ok 14.00 13.02 0.106 0.034
 
In summary, the recommended amount of minimum observations for p=0.07 has been 
calculated to be 90-150 observations in order to provide a reasonable approximation 
of the discrete binominal distribution by means of the normal distribution. 
 
 
2.2. Critique 2: Use of biased samples to measure performance 
 
The world fleet eligible for port state control inspections can be estimated to be 
around 47% (Knapp [6]) of the world fleet or approx. 44,000 vessels (above 400 gt, 
based on data for 2005). In addition, based on these vessels, more than 50% of vessels 
get inspected in more than one regime and 20% in three or more regimes. The same 
split up per flag further reveals the approximate figures [7]: 33% of all registries get 
inspected in six or more regions, 12% in five regions, 9 % in four, 10% in three, 11% 
in 2 regions and 19% in one region. About 6% do not get inspected at all. These 
figures clearly show that there is an overlap in inspection efforts across various 
regimes which can not and should not be ignored. By choosing only one dataset (one 
regime) for the evaluation of performance and ignoring the information contained in 
the samples of other regimes, one could list the following implications: 
 
o Important information of a vessel is omitted such as additional detentions and 
deficiencies. 
 
o The effect of an inspection performed outside one region is ignored and risk 
profiling of this particular vessel could therefore be overestimated and the 
wrong vessel be targeted for inspection. According to Knapp [6], the average 
effect of a PSC inspection (depending on the overall ship risk profile) is 
estimated to be around a 5% to 10% decrease in the probability of a very 
serious casualty per inspection. 
 
o One sample can only be seen as product of its own target factor and could be 
biased towards it. Each PSC regime uses target factors to decided whether a 
ship should be inspected or not in the effort to concentrate inspection efforts 
towards high risk vessels. Some regimes (e.g. USCG) performs a certain 
percentage of random inspections (about 5%) each year. In order to balance 
the sample towards increased randomness, it is recommended to combine the 
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samples of various regimes into one dataset to measure the overall 
performance of a flag. 
 
A possible remedy to rectify the shortcomings listed above is to combine inspection 
data from various PSC regimes as the basis to measure flag state performance. A 
possible criticism to this approach is the idea that the data cannot be combined due to 
technical reasons such as the incompatibility of the data or the different level of 
quality of inspections. However, the common practice of combining these types of 
datasets in the industry suggests otherwise and PSC data is combined by various 
industry players (e.g. Equasis, oil majors, maritime administrations) to provide a 
better picture of the performance of a fleet. Based on the legal framework of each 
MoU in existence, some differences can be uncovered but no significant differences 
with respect to the common goal which is the elimination of substandard vessels as a 
second line of defense.  
 
Based on standard econometric techniques, Knapp and Franses [8] examined the 
effect of inspections performed by various port state control regimes and showed that 
these reduce the probability of a casualty. While this effect might change across 
regimes, it is still found to reduce the probability of a casualty which means that in 
essence, each regime does eliminate substandard vessels. Similar results were found 
for port state control and industry inspections by Bijwaard and Knapp [9] using 
duration analysis and applying the models to ship life cycles over a 29 year period. 
 
 
2.3. Critique 3: Limited amount of factors to measure performance 
 
The current method is based on the number of inspections and detentions and omits 
other information of relevance such as the number the types of deficiencies which are 
found during an inspection. It also only takes port state control inspections into 
account and omits other types of failures such as maritime incidents. In principle, 
other factors might be relevant such as the age of the vessel or the ship type. The new 
proposed method will address some of these factors. 
 
2.4. Summary of critique of current method 
 
The main drawbacks of the current method can be summarized as follows: 
o The current sample size of 30 is small compared to a recommended number 
of 90-150 observations to ensure adequate approximation 
o The method cannot accommodate small sample sizes (flag states) 
o Data from several regimes are not combined and valuable information is 
omitted in measuring performance 
o Other factors such as the number and type of deficiencies found during 
inspections are not taken into account. 
o Other relevant information such as casualties are not taken into consideration 
o Applicable to large number of inspections can also lead to complications, as 
the larger N is, the narrower the grey list becomes and consequently, the grey 
list is incomparably smaller that the black and white ones. 
o The black, grey and white lists have no common criterion depicting the 
quality of a fleet. The role of this criterion is performed by the excess factor 
(EF), but its value depends on the list in question and is defined by different 
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procedures specific for each list. The boundary EF values are tailored for each 
list in order to ensure smooth transition from one list to another. 
 
Given the list of shortcomings of the current method to determine performance of a 
flag, we suggest a revised method which should address at least some of these 
shortcomings. The new method is referred to as the list of flag performance (LFP) 
instead of BGW-list used by the port state control regimes. This is due to the fact that 
besides port state control inspections, the new method also account for deficiencies 
and casualties as defined by the IMO [10] and therefore presents a wider concept of 
measuring performance and, consequently, the quality of a flag. 
 
 
3. An improved method to measure performance of flags 
 
3.1. General concept of the method 
 
Our proposed method ranks flag states based on one characteristic (Q; quality of a 
flag) which is common for all lists which facilitates comparisons across flags. By 
focusing on the ratio of the number of detentions over the number of inspections, 
smaller flag states can also be included in the BGW-list, which in this article we will 
denote by the list of flag performance (LFP). A further strong point of our proposal is, 
however, that the quality of a flag can be based on more information than just the 
number of inspections and the number of detentions as is the case in the current 
method. In particular, Q can be adjusted to take into account for example deficiencies 
or casualties, thereby allowing for a more accurate classification of flag states. 
 
Q reflects the quality of a flag and is defined as the expected ratio of the number of 
detentions (D) to the number of inspections (N) but corrected in such a way that also 
deficiencies and casualties are taken into account. In addition, the calculation of Q can 
in principle be easily extended further to also take into account a rich set of additional 
factors such as ship type, ship size, among other variables. 
 
The method is based on the ratio of detentions over inspections, in the sense that D/N 
is treated as an estimate of the (unobserved) probability of detention, p, for which in 
turn a normal probability distribution is assumed. Based partially on the latter 
assumption, the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval for p are derived 
which in turn are then combined with information on the number of deficiencies and 
casualties for each individual flag state. The method consists of adjusting D/N to a 
final value of Q which then reflects the quality of the flag. 
 
The method assumes that the probability of detention, p, is an unobserved number 
(contrary to the current method where it is imposed to be equal to 0.07) and therefore 
constructs a confidence interval which will contain p with a certain required level of 
probability (e.g. 95% which is denoted by β in the proposal). This confidence interval 
is derived under the assumption that p is normally distributed and that D/N can be 
used as an estimate for the unknown value of p. Given the set-up, the lower and upper 




The assumption of normality that underlies the method is an often-used assumption in 
statistics and is general very accurate. The derivation of the lower and upper limits of 
the confidence interval does, however, not crucially depend on this assumption of 
normality. The same limits result if the (weaker) assumption of just a symmetrical 
distribution for p is used. An alternative distribution would only result in a different 
factor tβ in the expressions for L and H9.  
 
Given L and H, the value of Q is then determined as D/N corrected with additional 
information regarding flag state quality and by incorporating deficiencies and 
casualties. In particular, the number of casualties, as well as the number of 
deficiencies of a flag state (the latter relative to the total number of deficiencies across 
all flag-states), will shift the value of Q away from D/N where the amount of the shift 
is directly proportional to the range between the limits L and H. As this range is larger 
for small flag states relative to larger flag states, this adjustment will have a bigger 
impact of the perceived flag quality of smaller flags.  
 
Practically our proposal implies that a characteristic should be developed, which is 
common to all three lists (the Black/Grey/White list) and which would not be based 
solely on the number of inspections and number of detentions, but also take into 
account deficiencies and casualties as defined by the IMO in MSC/Circ. 953 and 
MEPC/Circ. 372, Reports on Marine Casualties and Incidents, (14th December 2000) 
[10]10. The IMO currently distinguished between very serious, serious and less serious 
casualties but there are currently no mandatory reporting requirements for the latter 
two categories.  
 
For the proposed method, we therefore only take very serious casualties into account. 
In the future, the method could be adapted to also include other categories once the 
IMO casualty investigation code becomes mandatory and reporting requirements for 
casualty investigations change. For the purpose of this article, the following definition 
for very serious casualties is used [11]: 
 
‘A very serious casualty means a marine casualty involving the total loss of the ship 
or a death or severe damage to the environment’. 
 
It is worth noticing that the classification of casualty data from commercial data 
providers presents certain limitations. While seriousness can be identified and 
reclassified, some categories of the first events of a casualty are not readily available 
(e.g. in collisions, two ships are normally involved but not necessarily at fault). The 
data quality will hopefully improve in the future with the development of the Global 
Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS) at IMO. 
 
We prefer to base the measurement of performance or quality on port state control 
data in conjunction with casualty data in order to better capture the level of non-
compliance (given by the results of the port state control inspections) and the number 
                                                 
9 Note in particular that the notation of tβ is typically used for the Student-t distribution which, although it 
resembles the normal distribution by being bell-shaped and symmetrical, has more probability mass in the tails 
compared to the normal distribution. 
10 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC84) adopted MSC Resolution 255(84) on 16 May 2008 where the 
definitions were slightly changed and no longer distinguish between serious and less serious casualties. The 
definition for very serious casualty remains unchanged however. The reporting requirements will also change in 
the future. 
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of very serious casualties during a certain time period. If one would only base the 
analysis on casualty data, the outcome of the inspections are ignored including 
deficiency and detention information. Ships which are targeted for inspection can 
benefit from an inspection and the probability of casualty is therefore decreased (see 
Knapp [6] for a discussion on the topic where the decrease is estimated to be 6% per 
inspection). A measurement including both datasets provides a more balanced 
approach by taking the level of non-compliance into account. 
 
Finally, the limits of values of the characteristics for each list (B/G/W) should be 
defined aiming, in particular, to size all three lists in a similar way so that the new lists 
have comparable length. We will denominate this characteristic as Q. Let us consider 
Q as the expected ratio of the number of detentions (D) to the number of inspections 
(N) corrected by means of some (variable) number which takes account of 
deficiencies and casualties. 
 
 
3.2. Mathematical derivation of the proposed new method 
 
Mathematically our method could be interpreted as follows (at this stage, without 
accounting for deficiencies and casualties). An estimate of the unknown probability p 
of an event (detention in our case) could be obtained on the basis of its observed 
frequency p' in N independent trials. The result of an independent trial Xi (i=1. N) is 
taken as 1 in case of a detention and 0 if the inspection went successfully. The 
frequency p' is the mean value of the outcomes of Xi and is given by: 
 
∑== Ni iXNp 11'  
 
In this setup the population mean of the random variable X is equal to p and its 
dispersion equal to p*q, where q=1-p. The population mean of the frequency p' is also 
equal to p, i.e., the estimate of p is a fixed (non-moveable) value. The dispersion of p' 
(denoted by DIS) is equal to: 
 
[ ] ( )
N
pppDIS −⋅= 1'  
 
In theory, with the number of inspections going to infinity, p' converges in probability 
to p, meaning that the dispersion of p' around p reduces to zero. In practical terms, p' 
may be used in all cases to estimate the unknown value of p. However, correctness 
and reliability of this estimate are of importance – a so-called confidence interval (CI) 
for p should be obtained which length positively depends on DIS.  
 
Let us consider first a simple case when N is comparatively large and the true 
probability p is neither too low nor too high. We may then consider that the frequency 
p' is a random value and its distribution is close to the normal (or Gaussian) 
distribution. Calculations demonstrate that such an assumption may be used even with 
relatively low N values; it is practically acceptable when D exceeds 4 (Ventzel [12]). 
Let us assume this condition is fulfilled, and that the distribution of the frequency p' 
corresponds to the normal distribution. The population mean and square root of the 
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dispersion (root mean square deviation, 'pσ ) of the distribution of p' will then be 
defined by: 
 








Let us assume that also the value of p is known. Let us fix a confidence level β and 
define the interval (p – εβ, p + εβ) such that p' is contained therein with probabilityβ: 
 ( ) βε β =<−ppP '  
 
Since p' value is normally distributed, then 
 
















where Ф-1 is the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function Ф. To define 







 then 'pt σε ββ ⋅= , 
 
where tβ is to be found in standard normal probability tables11. Therefore we may, 




pptpp −⋅⋅<− 1' β
        (3) 
 
i.e. that the probability of detention p really lies within the limits of such an interval. 
In practice, we do not know the true value of p. Nevertheless, the expression in 
equation (3) will remain valid at probability β irrespective of whether the probability 
p is known or not. Having obtained from experience a specific p' value it is possible, 
by using (3), to define an interval which would contain the true value of p value with 
probabilityβ. By rewriting equation (3) we can then define the lower (L) and upper 
(H) limits of the interval (range) and by replacing the value of p' with that of D/N, we 
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It is worth noticing that in case D is smaller than 4 (Ventzel [12]) the task may be 
resolved by using numerical methods, when CI (confidence interval) is to be defined 
by a direct calculation of the difference of the values of the integral distribution 
function at the points (D/N – ε) and (D/N + ε). In this case CI may be defined exactly 
(without assumption on the normal distribution of p’), from the following equation: 
 
















11 .   (5) 
 
However, such an exact analytic solution is impossible with high numbers of 
inspections and detentions, as in such case the function of distribution of detention 
characteristic cannot be expressed through simple functions, and with fixed N and D it 
represents a polynomial expression of power N.  
 
In this article, however, we concentrate on sample sizes above 30 since by combining 
data from various port state control regimes, there are not many flags left with very 
small samples sizes. The extension of using equation (5) for very small sample sizes 
might be important if each regime continues to evaluate flags only on their own 
inspection data where the overall sample size is considerably smaller. Furthermore, 
we use the cut off point of 30 in order to be able to compare the results of the EF (as 
applied currently) and the new proposed method. 
 
For small fleets the width of the interval from L to H are substantially wide, and in 
their case the influence of the number and weight of deficiencies and casualties on Q 
is significant. For large fleets the range of Q variation is narrow, and deficiencies will 
not significantly influence Q. This is intuitive since with a high number of inspections 
the statistics of detention will describe the quality of a fleet sufficiently well. With a 
low number of inspections, the fleet quality characteristic Q should be adjusted 
through the statistics on deficiencies. This adjustment can be made by shifting the 
calculated value within the range obtained or beyond it. Therefore a fleet having a 
lower number of deficiencies with the same D/N ratio will be considered as a ‘better’ 
one in terms of Q, and the lower N is, the greater role will be attributed to the statistics 
of deficiencies. 
 
To take account of the presence of casualties of a flag state, Q may be adjusted 
(increased) by a value proportional to the length of the L to H range and some factor 
which is denominated as kz. This parameter acts like a kind of penalty factor. 
 
To take into consideration the number of deficiencies (D/NC) it could be proposed to 
compare the number of D/NCs for each included flag state (taking into consideration 
their ‘weight’), to a mean value of D/NCs across all flag states and, depending on the 
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results of such a comparison, to shift Q by a value proportional to the length of the L 














Z   (6) 
where  
D and N are the numbers of detentions and inspections 
kz – casualty ‘significance’ factor,  
Z – number of very serious casualties,  
Def – total weight of D/NCs revealed,  
DefMean – mean weight of D/NCs for all flags per one inspection during a 
reference period (one year in our case),  
H, L – bounds of the (Low , High) range calculated as shown above. 
 
To take account of the weight of a D/NC, Def should be defined as a sum of all D/NCs 
calculated with their weights where DefMean is to be calculated according to the 













1       (7) 
 
where   
M = number of all D/NCs for all Flag States within the reference period and 
NΣ =number of all inspections conducted during the reference period. 
 
 
3.3. Benefits and possible drawbacks of the proposed new method 
 
Two initial benefits of the proposed method relative to the current method are the 
following. The first benefit concerns the use of the yardstick probability of detention. 
With the current method, the probability of detention has to be determined 
exogenously (currently at 0.07). Even when this probability is determined based on 
data on detentions and inspections, it is not obvious what the ‘true’ probability of 
detention is. The new approach constructs confidence intervals for p, thereby stating 
that the true value of p will be contained within such intervals, without the need to 
know or assume the exact value.  
 
The second benefit results from using the ratio of the number of detentions over the 
number of inspections. A common assumption in the statistical literature is to assume 
that this quantity follows a normal distribution (provided that N is sufficiently large 
and p neither too close to either 0 or 1). Because the D/N takes on non-integer values 
there is no longer the need to approximate an integer-valued distribution with a 
continuous distribution as is the case in the current method where the focus is entirely 
on the number of detentions (which is integer-valued). The distributional assumptions 
and approximations needed for the current method are only valid if the sample size is 
sufficiently high. The new method is less sensitive to the number of observations and 
a smaller number of inspections are therefore acceptable in order to apply it to smaller 
sample sizes. 
13 
The main benefit of the proposed method is, however, that information beyond only 
inspections and detentions can be incorporated to assess the quality of flags. 
Casualties can be taken into consideration and accounted for where the combination 
of port state control data and casualty data is of direct interest of the performance 
indicator measurement at IMO level. The method, when applied to a combined 
datasets of global PSC and casualty data, can further provide a more refined method 
to measure performance and the quality of flag. 
 
Although additional analysis will be needed to determine how to best incorporate 
additional characteristics such as ship type, ship size and age, doing so allows for a 
fairer comparison of the quality of different flag states and will therefore result in a 
more accurate ranking of flag states on the list of flag performance (LFP). Our current 
proposed method does not yet include correction factors for these variables. 
 
The next section applies the proposed method to a combined dataset of PSC 




3.2. Application of the new method and comparison to the current method 
 
The dataset used for applying the new method is based on Knapp and Franses [8] and 
Bijwaard and Knapp [9] and covers a time period from January 2005 to December 
2007 for which data on casualties and port state control inspections was extracted. 
The dataset used in the analysis contains 197,334 inspections, 10,155 detentions 
(5.1%), 647,254 deficiencies and 332 very serious casualties. Data on casualties were 
combined from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay (LRF) and the IMO where data from LRF 
was reclassified according to IMO definitions to match the correct seriousness. 
Observations with unknown flag were grouped into one group denoted ‘unknown’.  
 
The current method as given in equation 1(a,b) and the proposed method, as given in 
equation (6), are applied to the data on hand for all flags with 30 or more 
observations. We first use the current method as currently applied (with sample size 
30) but we also apply the recommended minimum sample size of 90 based on the 
calculations presented in section 2.2 to ensure adequate approximation for the excess 
factor method. For the new method, the sample size of 30 is used since it assumes a 
normal distribution for the detention probability p (where D/N is the estimate of p) 
and the general concept that if the population distribution is close to normal, then 30 
in most cases will be sufficiently large. 
 
For the incorporation of the deficiencies based on equation (7), Table 2 provides the 
proposed weight factors used for the method indicating the seriousness of a deficiency 
group. Most weight is assigned to the group dealing with fire fighting appliances and 
life saving appliances followed by pollution prevention (MARPOL Annex I). Other 
deficiency groups such as certificates which are administrative deficiencies are given 
smaller weights compared to deficiencies which more likely provide an indication of 
the lack of proper maintenance of the vessel and safety management. 
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Various scenarios are presented and compared to the current excess factor method. 
The scenarios contain different significant factors for the casualties varying from zero 
(non-incorporation) to significant factor 2 (most conservative approach).  
 
• Base Scenario: current method in force with Rank EF (excess factor) 
• Scenario 1: Q without very serious casualties with Rank Q (no Z) 
• Scenario 2: Q including very serious casualties with Rank Q (kz=0.5) 
• Scenario 3: Q including very serious casualties with Rank Q (kz=1.0) 
• Scenario 4: Q including very serious casualties with Rank Q (kz=1.5) 
• Scenario 5: Q including very serious casualties with Rank Q (kz=2.0) 
 
Table 2: Weight factors used for deficiencies 
Group Description Weight 
0100 Certificates and documents 0.95 
0200 Crew documents 0.95 
0300 Crew and accommodation 0.90 
0400 Food and stores 0.85 
0500 Working spaces 0.90 
0600 Life-saving appliances 1.15 
0700 Fire fighting 1.20 
0800 Prevention of accidents 1.00 
0900 Safety in general 1.00 
1000 Alarms 0.98 
1100 Carriages of cargoes 0.95 
1200 Load Line 1.05 
1300 Mooring appliances 0.92 
1400 Propulsion and auxiliary engines 1.00 
1500 Safety of navigation 1.02 
1600 Radio communications 1.05 
1700 MARPOL Annex I - Oil 1.20 
1800 Oil, chemical and gas tankers 1.05 
1900 MARPOL Annex II – Noxious Liquid Substances 1.03 
2000 Solas related operational deficiencies 1.00 
2100 MARPOL relation operational deficiencies 1.01 
2200 MARPOL Annex III - IMDG 1.01 
2300 MARPOL Annex V - Garbage 1.01 
2500 Intern. Safety Management Code (ISM) 1.05 
2600 Bulk Carriers – additional safety measures 1.10 
9800 Other deficiencies – with hazard 1.10 
9900 Other deficiencies – no hazard 1.00 
 
The results are presented in Appendix 1 where the current method is denoted with EF 
(excess factor) and the results for the new proposed method are denoted by Q 
(Quality). In addition, the total number of inspections (N), detentions (D), deficiencies 
(Total Def) and very serious casualties (Z) for the 3 year period are given for the flags 
that were evaluated. Flags which were not evaluated are listed at the end of the table. 
Out of the total 139 flags, 107 are evaluated (21 more than with the current method if 
the recommended sample size of 90 is used) and 32 are below sample size 30.  
 
It is worth noticing that we keep registries separate from the traditional registries (e.g. 
the Norwegian International Registry or the Danish International Registries). As 
indicated in section 3.2, the smaller flags could also be evaluated by using equation 
(5) but for the purpose of the demonstration of the new method and the comparison to 
the present method, we use sample size 30 and exclude all flags below sample size 30. 
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In order to compare the results, the rank of each flag for each scenario is calculated 
and presented in the table in the last three columns and sorted by the most 
conservative approach for k=2. In order to evaluate the two methods, we base the 
comparison on sample size 30 for both methods so that the ranks can be compared. 
The last two columns present the best and the worst rank of the flag across all 
methods. 
 
In addition to the ranks, the flags evaluated with the new method are also classified 
according to the old concept of the BGW-list. However, comparison of this 
classification with the old method is not straight forward since the length of the lists is 
not the same for the old method. This classification should only be taken as an overall 
guidance in comparing the two methods. 
 
 
4. Evaluation of proposed method and relevant policy implications 
 
This last section of the article provides a discussion of the results and relevant policy 
implications. In evaluating the proposed method, the following underlying criteria are 
used: 
1. The validity and workability of the method presented from a statistical 
perspective and its ability to deal with smaller sample sizes 
2. The combination of information used to measure performance and the level of 
access to the requested data 
3. The added value of changing the method including its possible impact 
4. The variability of the results when applying various methods to the same data 
 
With respect to item 1, the new method is based on general theory of probability. The 
assumption of normality that underlies the method is an often-used assumption in 
statistics and is generally very accurate and more accurate than the probabilistic 
assumptions underlying the current method. An advantage of the new proposed 
method versus the current method is that more flags can be evaluated due to the 
smaller required sample sizes. Workability of the method is relatively straight forward 
and allows running scenarios based on different significant factors (k factors) and 
deficiency weights so that regional and global differences can be taken into 
consideration. 
 
With respect to the combination of data which is used for the new method, a clear 
advantage of the proposed method compared to the current method is the 
incorporation of past deficiency information and casualty information although 
casualty data from commercial data providers need to be reclassified to match the 
IMO definitions of seriousness.  
 
It is worth noticing that the identification of casualty first events with respect of 
collision and contacts should be improved with commercial data providers so that a 
better distinction between ships at fault and ships that are merely a victim of a 
collision can made. For the purpose of this analysis, we excluded the category 
collision of very serious casualties since this distinction at current is not clear in the 
data available via commercial data providers. A future possible incorporation could be 
different weight factors for different types of casualties depending on their 
seriousness. 
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Access to the data and the improvement of the identification of first events and 
categorization of seriousness of casualty data will be improved with the development 
of the Global Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS) at IMO. It is also planned 
that GISIS will contain port state control information from all regional MoU’s and 
will therefore combine both data sources. For the time being, commercial data can be 
used which is easily accessible. 
 
For reasons of conciseness, additional variables such as the age, size and ship type are 
not yet taken into account in our current analysis and further analysis would therefore 
be required to study how these ship and flag state characteristics should be best taken 
into account and how important these are with respect to measuring overall 
performance. Other areas of measurement such as results of flag state audits could 
also be incorporated in the future so that a similar method can be used to measure the 
performance of a member state where flag state performance would only be one 
component. 
 
Criteria items 3 and 4 are more difficult to evaluate. Appendix 1 presents an 
indication of the variability of the results when applied to the same data and under 
various scenarios while Figure 2 presents the results graphically for the top 20 flags. 
 
































































































































Figure 2 indicates the best rank and the worst rank by using the EF method and any of 
the scenarios of the proposed method. This differences are due to the incorporation of 
the deficiencies and the casualties (with various weight factors) and are therefore 
mostly the differences of the ranks of the EF method and the new method at k=2 or 
1.5. Top difference in rank is with 89 ranks for Spain followed by 74 (Chile), 61 
(Philippines) and 60 (Canada). The possible impact is the shift of some flags with 
respect to their ranks where the shift can go into both directions. Where shifts lead to 
a decrease in rank, it becomes politically very sensitive and vice versa, especially for 
flags where one can observe large variability. If the method is applied globally, then it 
should be applied to a combined dataset of all port state control regimes and casualty 
17 
data by using the definitions of IMO. In this way, the underlying dataset is less biased 
and present a more complete picture then applying the method separately in each area. 
 
Although the shift of the flags with respect to the classification of black, gray and 
white is not a straight forward comparison as indicated below, we will provide a high 
level interpretation. Most flags which are on the black list under the current method 
also appear on the list of the worst performing flags. Incorporation of deficiencies and 
casualties compared to the current method leads to a shift of some white listed flags 
under the current method to the grey or black area with different k factors. These flags 
are Panama, the Philippines, India, Turkey and Russia. In addition, some flags 
improve their ranking under the new method such as Denmark which is on the grey 
list under the current method (rank 53) and moved to rank 1 under the new method. 
Another example would be the Faeroe Islands, Austria, Estonia, Brazil, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Myanmar. 
 
The added value of the proposed method can be summarized to be a method with a 
higher level of accuracy based on general theory of probability using standard 
statistical assumptions. It further allows the evaluation of flags with smaller sample 
sizes compared to the current method where the minimum sample size is 
recommended to be 90 (not the 30 currently used). The underlying combination of 
data is less biased and contains more relevant information to measure flag 
performance (e.g. inspection results from various regimes, the number and type of 
deficiencies or very serious casualties). Furthermore, regulators can determine the 
level of importance of deficiencies by using weights for deficiencies and casualties. 
Finally, the method can also be applied to recognized organizations (RO) once data 
and deficiency information becomes more readily available. Another area of 
application would be the DoC companies where sample sizes are very small due to the 
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Appendix 1: List of flag performance (LFP) - results of current method and new method for the years 2005-2007 for various scenarios of k 
 Total Total Total       no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 EF Q Q Q Q Q best worst 
Flag N D Def Z EF(90) EF(30) Q Q Q Q Q no Z no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 rank rank 
Indonesia 591 111 5424 16 4.068 4.068 0.282 1.050 1.820 2.590 3.360 95 93 105 106 107 107 93 107 
Bangladesh 45 16 448 3 BSS 6.661 0.785 1.380 1.970 2.560 3.150 103 105 107 107 106 106 103 107 
North Korea 1291 370 13625 16 7.533 7.533 0.371 0.974 1.580 2.180 2.780 105 99 103 104 105 105 99 105 
Jordan 43 17 428 2 BSS 7.738 0.824 1.230 1.640 2.050 2.460 106 106 106 105 104 104 104 106 
Honduras 225 46 1307 4 4.061 4.061 0.276 0.595 0.915 1.230 1.550 94 91 98 102 102 103 91 103 
Libya 67 25 803 1 BSS 7.863 0.824 0.992 1.160 1.330 1.490 107 107 104 103 103 102 102 107 
Comoros 1049 221 9476 6 5.009 5.009 0.278 0.504 0.730 0.956 1.180 98 92 97 100 100 101 92 101 
Bolivia 88 24 856 1 BSS 5.244 0.558 0.696 0.833 0.970 1.110 100 101 102 101 101 100 100 102 
Sierra Leone 560 125 5501 3 5.160 5.160 0.331 0.489 0.647 0.804 0.962 99 97 96 98 99 99 96 99 
Maldives Islands 40 5 209 1 BSS 0.849 0.290 0.447 0.605 0.763 0.920 73 94 94 96 98 98 73 98 
Cambodia 6789 908 54122 14 2.901 2.901 0.152 0.326 0.499 0.673 0.846 89 74 89 93 96 97 74 97 
St. Kitts and Nevis 380 79 3539 2 4.486 4.486 0.327 0.451 0.575 0.700 0.824 96 96 95 94 97 96 94 97 
Cook Islands 145 14 709 2 0.847 0.847 0.156 0.306 0.457 0.607 0.757 72 75 87 91 93 95 72 95 
Panama 39677 1977 132138 52 -0.612 -0.612 0.050 0.220 0.391 0.561 0.732 43 52 77 86 90 94 43 94 
Mongolia 693 107 5769 3 3.084 3.084 0.223 0.346 0.469 0.593 0.716 90 86 92 92 91 93 86 93 
St. Vincent & the Gren. 4868 489 25087 11 1.784 1.784 0.108 0.251 0.393 0.535 0.678 83 69 79 87 88 92 69 92 
Spain   49 0 86 2 BSS 0.001 -0.042 0.134 0.310 0.486 0.662 52 2 61 77 86 91 2 91 
Sri Lanka 41 13 334 0 BSS 5.395 0.648 0.648 0.648 0.648 0.648 101 104 101 99 95 90 90 104 
Slovakia 494 89 3043 2 3.752 3.752 0.230 0.334 0.437 0.541 0.644 92 87 91 89 89 89 87 92 
United Arab Emirates 79 10 270 1 BSS 1.079 0.169 0.282 0.395 0.508 0.621 76 79 83 88 87 88 76 88 
Moldavia 62 19 560 0 BSS 5.764 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.618 102 103 100 97 94 87 87 103 
Philippines 609 12 1547 8 -1.272 -1.272 0.023 0.168 0.313 0.459 0.604 25 34 70 79 85 86 25 86 
Kiribati 71 17 752 0 BSS 4.024 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.599 0.599 93 102 99 95 92 85 85 102 
Dominica 375 40 2338 2 1.404 1.404 0.159 0.255 0.351 0.447 0.544 79 77 80 85 84 84 77 85 
Chile 40 1 101 1 BSS 0.215 -0.003 0.124 0.251 0.378 0.505 56 9 59 73 78 83 9 83 
Azerbaijan 168 19 1020 1 1.217 1.217 0.196 0.270 0.344 0.418 0.492 77 84 82 82 82 82 77 84 
Lebanon 256 35 1784 1 2.116 2.116 0.221 0.285 0.349 0.414 0.479 85 85 84 84 81 81 81 85 
India 681 23 1762 5 -0.739 -0.739 0.035 0.143 0.251 0.358 0.466 39 47 64 72 76 80 39 80 
Georgia 1945 383 16034 2 4.742 4.742 0.239 0.293 0.347 0.401 0.455 97 88 85 83 80 79 79 97 
Thailand 1590 105 7513 5 0.317 0.317 0.077 0.171 0.265 0.359 0.453 60 63 72 75 77 78 60 78 
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 Total Total Total       no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 EF Q Q Q Q Q best worst 
Flag N D Def Z EF(90) EF(30) Q Q Q Q Q no Z no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 rank rank 
Albania 304 94 2636 0 7.530 7.530 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.442 0.442 104 100 93 90 83 77 77 104 
Turkey 3975 244 15795 8 -0.064 -0.064 0.065 0.156 0.248 0.339 0.431 50 60 66 71 75 76 50 76 
Syria 782 135 7836 1 3.699 3.699 0.258 0.299 0.339 0.380 0.420 91 89 86 81 79 75 75 91 
Taiwan, China 438 33 1642 2 0.626 0.626 0.090 0.167 0.244 0.320 0.397 70 66 69 70 73 74 66 74 
Russia 4575 256 14451 8 -0.271 -0.271 0.056 0.138 0.220 0.302 0.384 47 54 62 68 69 73 47 73 
Belize 3041 298 18558 4 1.645 1.645 0.113 0.178 0.243 0.308 0.372 81 70 75 69 70 72 69 81 
Tuvalu 616 82 4685 1 2.383 2.383 0.195 0.236 0.277 0.318 0.359 88 83 78 76 72 71 71 88 
Pakistan 65 10 436 0 BSS 1.615 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.334 80 98 90 80 74 70 70 98 
Jamaica 97 16 668 0 2.269 2.269 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.313 86 95 88 78 71 69 69 95 
Papua New Guinea 45 2 405 0 BSS 0.327 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 0.264 62 90 81 74 68 68 62 90 
Vietnam 1188 134 7819 1 1.940 1.940 0.145 0.172 0.200 0.227 0.255 84 72 73 67 67 67 67 84 
Unknown Flag 7008 603 29559 4 1.355 1.355 0.089 0.130 0.170 0.210 0.250 78 65 60 64 66 66 60 78 
South Korea 3884 63 15536 9 -1.673 -1.673 0.019 0.074 0.130 0.186 0.241 9 28 53 58 65 65 9 65 
Canada 174 1 95 2 -1.386 -1.386 -0.021 0.043 0.107 0.171 0.235 19 4 37 55 61 64 4 64 
Japan 624 12 1427 3 -1.299 -1.299 0.021 0.074 0.127 0.181 0.234 23 30 52 57 64 63 23 64 
Malta 9514 432 31061 6 -0.698 -0.698 0.046 0.084 0.123 0.161 0.200 40 50 56 56 58 62 40 62 
Algeria 164 16 1031 0 0.885 0.885 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 74 82 76 66 63 61 61 82 
Tonga 87 8 419 0 BSS 0.716 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 71 81 74 65 62 60 60 81 
Israel 210 5 315 1 -0.638 -0.638 0.023 0.060 0.097 0.133 0.170 42 35 46 51 54 59 35 59 
Poland 116 12 548 0 0.886 0.886 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 75 80 71 63 60 58 58 80 
Egypt 293 35 1571 0 1.677 1.677 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.166 82 78 68 62 59 57 57 82 
Cyprus 6640 216 16528 5 -1.123 -1.123 0.032 0.064 0.097 0.130 0.163 29 43 49 52 53 56 29 56 
Morocco 169 12 1131 0 0.514 0.514 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 68 76 67 61 57 55 55 76 
Ukraine 986 125 5143 0 2.331 2.331 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 87 73 65 60 56 54 54 87 
Tunisia 57 3 333 0 BSS 0.365 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 65 71 63 59 55 53 53 71 
Norway   203 3 349 1 -1.007 -1.007 -0.001 0.033 0.067 0.101 0.135 33 11 28 46 50 52 11 52 
Greece 4348 88 6448 4 -1.535 -1.535 0.018 0.044 0.070 0.095 0.121 14 26 38 47 48 51 14 51 
United States of America 339 6 742 1 -1.155 -1.155 0.022 0.047 0.071 0.096 0.120 28 32 41 48 49 50 28 50 
Kuwait 111 9 342 0 0.625 0.625 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 69 68 58 54 52 49 49 69 
Liberia 8797 227 19097 4 -1.378 -1.378 0.025 0.045 0.065 0.086 0.106 21 37 39 44 47 48 21 48 
Ethiopia 44 2 207 0 BSS 0.336 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 63 67 57 53 51 47 47 67 
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 Total Total Total       no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 EF Q Q Q Q Q best worst 
Flag N D Def Z EF(90) EF(30) Q Q Q Q Q no Z no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 rank rank 
Italy 2214 52 4159 2 -1.354 -1.354 0.021 0.041 0.061 0.080 0.100 22 31 35 40 46 46 22 46 
Honk Kong, China 7369 109 15755 5 -1.760 -1.760 0.014 0.035 0.057 0.078 0.099 6 20 31 35 45 45 6 45 
China 3477 38 8377 4 -1.859 -1.859 0.011 0.033 0.054 0.076 0.098 3 17 27 33 40 44 3 44 
Vanuatu 462 8 740 1 -1.292 -1.292 0.016 0.036 0.057 0.077 0.097 24 23 32 36 42 43 23 43 
Norway (NIS) 4180 84 7293 3 -1.537 -1.537 0.018 0.038 0.058 0.077 0.097 13 27 33 37 43 42 13 43 
Bermuda 803 7 762 2 -1.790 -1.790 0.006 0.029 0.051 0.073 0.096 5 14 23 32 39 41 5 41 
Bulgaria 586 37 2439 0 0.311 0.311 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 59 64 55 50 44 40 40 64 
Romania 76 4 313 0 BSS 0.341 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 64 62 54 49 41 39 39 64 
Sweden 1204 9 1649 2 -1.897 -1.897 0.006 0.023 0.039 0.056 0.073 1 15 15 26 32 38 1 38 
Latvia 174 10 442 0 0.319 0.319 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 61 61 51 45 38 37 37 61 
Myanmar 174 7 584 0 0.071 0.071 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 55 59 50 43 37 36 36 59 
Lithuania 345 20 918 0 0.250 0.250 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 57 58 48 42 36 35 35 58 
Isle of Man 1685 36 2219 1 -1.401 -1.401 0.017 0.028 0.039 0.050 0.061 18 25 22 25 28 34 18 34 
Bahamas 9116 217 17043 2 -1.450 -1.450 0.022 0.032 0.041 0.051 0.061 16 33 26 27 29 33 16 33 
Brazil 72 4 250 0 BSS 0.372 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 66 57 47 41 35 32 32 66 
Malaysia 1006 53 3689 0 -0.133 -0.133 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 49 56 45 39 34 31 31 56 
Estonia 139 5 419 0 0.066 0.066 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 54 55 44 38 33 30 30 55 
Antigua & Barbuda 7625 262 15880 1 -1.067 -1.067 0.033 0.039 0.045 0.051 0.058 30 44 34 29 30 29 29 44 
Singapore 5126 80 10053 2 -1.712 -1.712 0.014 0.025 0.035 0.046 0.056 8 21 20 24 26 28 8 28 
Netherlands Antilles 1129 63 3049 0 -0.047 -0.047 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 51 53 43 34 31 27 27 53 
Denmark (DIS) 1856 33 2915 1 -1.550 -1.550 0.015 0.025 0.034 0.044 0.053 12 22 17 22 24 26 12 26 
Austria 56 3 179 0 BSS 0.374 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 67 51 42 31 27 25 25 67 
Iran 549 19 2077 0 -0.641 -0.641 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 41 49 40 30 25 24 24 49 
Croatia 396 15 1011 0 -0.389 -0.389 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 45 48 36 28 23 23 23 48 
Cayman Islands 1040 38 2303 0 -0.740 -0.740 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 38 46 30 23 22 22 22 46 
Madeira 620 20 1581 0 -0.770 -0.770 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 36 45 29 21 21 21 21 45 
United Kingdom 2643 27 3769 1 -1.867 -1.867 0.008 0.015 0.021 0.027 0.033 2 16 12 14 17 20 2 20 
Irish Republic 190 6 298 0 -0.233 -0.233 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 48 42 25 20 20 19 19 48 
Barbados 545 13 1543 0 -1.061 -1.061 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 31 41 24 19 19 18 18 41 
Faeroe Islands 71 3 201 0 BSS 0.256 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 58 40 21 18 18 17 17 58 
Gibraltar 1124 32 1891 0 -1.058 -1.058 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 32 38 18 17 16 16 16 38 
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 Total Total Total       no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 EF Q Q Q Q Q best worst 
Flag N D Def Z EF(90) EF(30) Q Q Q Q Q no Z no Z k=0.5 k=1.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 rank rank 
Spain (CSR) 306 8 504 0 -0.746 -0.746 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 37 39 19 16 15 15 15 39 
Australia 159 2 670 0 -0.942 -0.942 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 35 36 16 15 14 14 14 36 
Netherlands 4255 94 6352 0 -1.466 -1.466 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 15 29 14 13 13 13 13 29 
Marshall Islands 4325 82 7948 0 -1.581 -1.581 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 11 24 13 12 12 12 11 24 
Finland 558 6 1097 0 -1.632 -1.632 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 10 19 11 11 11 11 10 19 
Germany 7973 110 10181 0 -1.798 -1.798 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 4 18 10 10 10 10 4 18 
France   144 1 448 0 -1.162 -1.162 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 27 13 9 9 9 9 9 27 
Saudi Arabia 133 3 274 0 -0.338 -0.338 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 46 12 8 8 8 8 8 46 
Belgium 322 4 424 0 -1.381 -1.381 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 20 10 7 7 7 7 7 20 
Switzerland 193 2 310 0 -1.207 -1.207 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 26 8 6 6 6 6 6 26 
French Antarctic Territory 233 2 273 0 -1.416 -1.416 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 17 7 5 5 5 5 5 17 
Luxembourg 160 2 210 0 -0.950 -0.950 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 34 6 4 4 4 4 4 34 
France (FIS) 184 0 225 0 -1.739 -1.739 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 7 5 3 3 3 3 3 7 
Qatar 92 1 113 0 -0.501 -0.501 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 44 3 2 2 2 2 2 44 
Denmark 44 0 79 0 BSS 0.031 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 53 1 1 1 1 1 1 53 
Note: Flags below sample size are not listed and are as follows: Seychelles, Ghana, Fiji, Mauritius, Mexico, Bahrain, Cuba, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Venezuela, Brunei, Namibia, Iceland, 
Argentina, Guyana, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Portugal, Samoa, Colombia, Sao Tome & Principe, Wallis & Futuna, Peru, Angola, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Sudan, Somalia, South Africa, Ecuador, 
and Kazakhstan. 
 
